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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals is conferred with ]ui.isdjct INH u>"t i 
the :i nstant appeal pursuant to Utal i Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (e) 
(2002). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES VL_STANDARDILJQF REVIEW 
1. Whether the ti^a- :;•,: . ; <r_ ••-:.-..*_ ^  :•_'•-. 
jury so as to both undermine the jury's responsibility to fine t:;e 
ultimate facts beyond a reasonable dc^ ;_* : . • ...;•: 
persuasion to Defendant. This issue is raised for the first t: *:ie 
on appeal pursuant to plain error, Jn State \ Minn 
*
 ;
 , Lue Utah Supreme Court outlined the fo"lowing 
principles involved, in determining whether "plain error" ^ : s ; ^ : 
In general, to establish the existence of 
plain error and to obtain appellate relief 
from an alleged error that was not properly 
objected to, the appellant must show the 
following: (i) An error exists; (ii) the 
error should have been obvious to the trial 
court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., 
absent the error, there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for 
the appellant, or phrased differently, our 
confidence in the verdict is undermined. 
iii il iJ,nh ii'i decent Strilt " M F M ' M 'fnv TIT App 201, 111J5-6, 
113 P.3d 998. 
Preservation ul^L&im^ LLLLatixxi uiiJlLat.emLTiL ol Gjxmndt£-.l&z iLe vi eM: 
Issues involving plain error cons t i tu te an exception to the 
] 
preservation rule and as such may be raised for the first time on 
appeal. 
2. Whether appointed trial counsel denied Mr. Bennett of 
the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel 
by failing to object to the trial court's proposed jury 
instruction involving the possession of stolen property. To make 
such a showing, a defendant must show, first, that counsel 
rendered a deficient performance, falling below an objective 
standard of reasonable professional judgment, and, second, that 
counsel's performance was prejudicial. Bundy v. DeLand, 763 P.2d 
803 (Utah 1988). The appellate court reviews such a claim as a 
matter of law. State v. Maestas, 1999 UT 32, f20# 984 P.2d 376. 
Preservation of Issue Citation or Statement of Grounds for Review: 
Issues involving claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
constitute an exception to the preservation rule and as such may 
be raised for the first time on appeal. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, 
regulations, or case law whose interpretation is determinative, 
are set out verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the body 
and arguments of the instant Brief of Appellant. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves the i a j J m e b/ I i I" i h* I i i ii " JM i I 
appointed trial counsel to accurately instruct the jury regarding 
the law to be applied in the course of :i t:s deIibe z atioi is . The 
failure to instruct the jury precluded Mr Bennett of a fa i r 
trial. 
The State charged Mr. Bennett with one count of Burglary, a 
second-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ani i § 76 6-202, 
.:IL oi Theft, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann n ^ - 6 - 4 0 4 . Mr. Bennett appeared before the 
<A'•-* • • : .- . pleaded not guilty. 
Mr. Bennett appeared before the court for a jury trial on 
Marcli I , , M ],
 im. I Apiil , , ?«if,4 Mr Bennett did not testify in 
his own behalf at trial. 
At t l ie cone] us3 :: i i : f ti: :i all , t l le ji ir} r d,el :i b e r a t e d fo r a l i t t l e 
over two hours and then convicted Mr. Bennett as charged. 
r 1 :i : B e i 11 i e 1 1 w a :i ,;: T e :i 11 i e t :i n t. e f o z s e n t: e n c :i i i g . Base d I i p o n t h e 
conviction of Burglary, a second-degree felony, the trial court 
s e i I t: e i I c e d I I :i : B e n n e 11: t: a a i i :i i i d e t e r n L i i i a t e t e z n: i o f i i c • t ] e s s 11 I a i i 
one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison and, 
based oi I tl ie coi l ! ; i cti c i i :)f Theft: a clas s B tin sdemeai io:r , tl ie ti :i al 
court sentenced Mr. Bennett to a term of 180 days, Mr. Bennett 
filed a timely pro se Notice of Appeal oi ) Apr i ] ] 4 
3 
STATEMENT QF FACTS 
1. In the afternoon on November 18, 2003, two individuals 
allegedly burglarized the Deason home located in Layton (R. 
106:102-06). 
2. Sometime thereafter, the State charged Mr. Bennett with 
one count of Burglary, a second-degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202, and one count of Theft, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (R. 1-2). 
See R. 1-2, Information, a true and correct copy of which is 
attached hereto as Addendum A. 
3. Mr. Bennett appeared before the district court and 
pleaded not guilty (R. 11-12). 
4. Mr. Bennett appeared before the court for a jury trial 
on March 31, 2004, and April 2, 2004 (R. 24-27 and R. 30-32) . 
5. Through the course of the trial, the State at no time 
presented any physical evidence tying Mr. Bennett to the burglary 
(R. 106:107:8-17 (lack of fingerprints); R. 106:111:12-17 (lack of 
eyewitness identification)). 
6. The main focus of the State's case against Mr. Bennett 
rested, at best, upon the possession of stolen property (R. 
106:212-13; R. 105:321:18-23). 
7. Mr. Bennett did not testify in his own behalf at trial 
(R. 105:279:17-18). 
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8. In the course of the trial, counsel, met with the trial 
court and reviewed the proposed jury instruct J L"J it "I h"1 ,<!?'"• :'i-
6 ) . Mr. Bennett's appointed trial counsel did not object to the 
jury instruetions (R. 105:276:5-18) . 
9. After presentation of the evidence, the trial court, as 
part of the jury instructions, charged the jury with the following 
inRtrin-l join -is lii Hit-' possession of stolen property: 
Mere possession of recently stolen property, 
if not coupled with other inculpatory or 
incriminating circumstances, is not sufficient to 
support a conviction for burglary. Possession of 
articles recently stolen, however, when coupled 
with circumstances inconsistent with innocence, 
such as hiding or concealing them, or of making a 
false or improbable or unsatisfactory explanation,, 
of the possession, may be sufficient to connect 
the possessor with the offense and to justify his 
conviction for burglary. 
In order for the defendant's possession of 
recently stolen property to be sufficient to 
support a conviction of burglary, such possession 
must be recent, that is, not too remote in point 
of time from, the crime, personal, exclusive 
(although, it may be joint if definite), distinct, 
conscious, and such possession must be coupled 
with a lack of a satisfactory explanation or other 
incriminati ng c i rcumst anc e s a s menti oned 
previously. If these conditions are met, then you 
may consider possession of recently stolen 
property, coupled with other inculpatory or 
incriminating circumstances as evidence of 
burglary. 
( b<rt • ] 2 i ] i n:y Ii isti i :ict::i c i i No 3 3 , a true and 
correct copy of which, is attached hereto as Addendum B. 
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10. The jury, at the conclusion of trial, deliberated for a 
little over two hours, after which it convicted Mr. Bennett as 
charged (R. 31; R. 105:326:14-18; R. 77). 
11. Mr. Bennett waived the time for sentencing (R. 105:330-
32) . 
12. Based upon the conviction of Burglary, a second-degree 
felony, the trial court sentenced Mr. Bennett "to an indeterminate 
term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the 
Utah State Prison" and, based on the conviction of Theft, a class 
B misdemeanor, the trial court sentenced Mr. Bennett "to a term of 
180 days" (R. 31-32) . 
13. Mr. Bennett filed a timely pro se Notice of Appeal on 
April 14, 2004 (R. 79). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. By utilizing Jury Instruction No. 33, the trial court 
impermissibly instructed the jury so as to both undermine the 
jury's responsibility to find the ultimate facts beyond a 
reasonable doubt and shift the burden of persuasion to Defendant. 
Given the lack of qualifying instructions concerning the effect of 
the presumption or inference in the instruction, the jury could 
have believed that it had to apply the presumption. Moreover, 
the jury could have believed that the quantum of evidence 
6 
pertaining to the instruction was something less than beyond a 
reasonable doubt due to the total lack of explanation concerning 
the applicable standard of proof. 
The trial court is under a sacred duty to accurately instruct 
the jury as to the applicable law. In the instant case, the trial 
court erred by instructing the jury so as to undermine the jury's 
responsibility as the fact finder and shift the burden of 
persuasion to Mr. Bennett, as the Defendant. The error should 
have been obvious in light of the aforementioned case law both 
from the United States Supreme Court and Utah concerning the 
effects of such an instruction. 
This error was harmful because the subject instruction 
undermined the jury's responsibility as the finder of fact and it 
shifted the burden of persuasion to Mr. Bennett, as the Defendant, 
thereby diminishing the required burden-of-proof standard to be 
utilized by the jury in its deliberations. The harmfulness is 
further demonstrated by the focus placed upon the circumstances 
surrounding Jury Instruction No. 33 by the State in its case-in-
chief as well as its closing argument. Had the jury been properly 
instructed or, in other words, absent the error, there is a 
reasonable likelihood that Mr. Bennett would have had a more 
favorable outcome at trial. Based on the totality of 
7 
circumstances surrounding the subject instruction, one's 
confidence in the verdict is significantly undermined. 
2. Appointed trial counsel denied Mr. Bennett of his Sixth 
Amendment Right to the effective assistance of counsel by failing 
to object to the trial court's proposed jury instruction involving 
the possession of stolen property. Appointed trial counsel's 
failure to object to the proposed jury instruction fell below an 
objective standard of reasonable professional judgment. But for 
counsel's unprofessional error of failing to object, the result at 
trial would have been different. By objecting to the instruction, 
the trial court more likely than not would have corrected the 
instruction so as not to undermine the jury's responsibility as 
the ultimate fact finder and shift the burden of persuasion to Mr. 
Bennett, as the Defendant. 
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ARGUMENTS 
I. THE TRIAL COURT IMPERMISSIBLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY 
SO AS TO UNDERMINE THE JURY'S RESPONSIBILITY TO 
FIND THE ULTIMATE FACTS BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT 
AND SHIFT THE BURDEN OF PERSUASION TO DEFENDANT. 
As enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in In re 
Winship, 297 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068 (1970), the Due Process 
Clause requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact 
necessary to constitute the crime charged. Id. at 364, 90 S.Ct. 
at 1073. The Court stated, "Lest there remain any doubt about the 
constitutional stature of the reasonable doubt standard, we 
explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused 
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of 
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is 
charged." Id.; accord Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 211, 
97 S.Ct. 2319, 2327 (1977). 
After the close of evidence in the instant case, the trial 
court charged the jury with the following instruction as to the 
possession by Mr. Bennett of stolen property: 
Mere possession of recently stolen property, 
if not coupled with other inculpatory or 
incriminating circumstances, is not sufficient to 
support a conviction for burglary. Possession of 
articles recently stolen, however, when coupled 
with circumstances inconsistent with innocence, 
such as hiding or concealing them, or of making a 
false or improbable or unsatisfactory explanation 
of the possession, may be sufficient to connect 
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the possessor with the offense and to justify his 
conviction for burglary. 
In order for the defendant's possession of 
recently stolen property to be sufficient to 
support a conviction of burglary, such possession 
must be recent, that is, not too remote in point 
of time from the crime, personal, exclusive 
(although it may be joint if definite), distinct, 
conscious, and such possession must be coupled 
with a lack of a satisfactory explanation or other 
incriminating circumstances as mentioned 
previously. If these conditions are met, then you 
may consider possession of recently stolen 
property, coupled with other inculpatory or 
incriminating circumstances as evidence of 
burglary. 
(See R. 53). Not only did Jury Instruction No. 33 undermine the 
jury's responsibility as the fact finder, it shifted the burden of 
persuasion to Mr. Bennett, as the Defendant. 
In State v. Chambers, 709 P.2d 321 (Utah 1985), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that an instruction that raises a presumption 
of guilt, and thereby impermissibly shifts the burden to the 
defendant to prove his innocence, is unconstitutional. Id. at 
325-27; see also State v. Smith, 726 P.2d 1232, 1234 (Utah 1986). 
Similarly, the jury instruction in question in the case at bar, 
Jury Instruction No. 33, raised an impermissible presumption of 
guilt. In fact, by its plain language, the jury may presume or 
consider the possession of recently stolen property coupled with 
an unsatisfactory explanation of the possession as "evidence of 
burglary,." 
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As a threshold inquiry in ascertaining the constitutional 
analysis applicable to this kind of jury instruction, the 
appellate court must determine the nature of the presumption set 
forth in the instruction. See County Court of Ulster County v. 
Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157-163, 99 S. Ct. 2213 (1979). Such a 
determination requires careful attention to the words actually 
spoken to the jury, for whether a defendant has been accorded his 
or her constitutional rights depends upon the way in which a 
reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction. Id. at 
157-59, n.16, 99. S.Ct. 2213. 
Given the lack of qualifying instructions concerning the 
effect of the presumption or inference, the jury could have 
believed that it had to apply the presumption. Cf. State v. 
Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069, 1075 (Utah 1987) (discussing curative 
effect of explanatory instruction) . Being told that "you may 
consider possession of recently stolen property, coupled with 
other inculpatory or incriminating circumstances as evidence of 
burglary'' could reasonably be construed as being told that the 
matter is presumed with there being no choice as to the effect. 
Moreover, the jury could have believed that the quantum of 
evidence was something less than beyond a reasonable doubt due to 
the total lack of explanation in the instruction concerning the 
applicable standard of proof. 
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A reasonable jury could well have interpreted the conditions 
outlined in the instruction as an irrebuttable directive of the 
court to find intent once convinced of the facts triggering the 
presumption. On the other hand, the jury may have interpreted the 
instruction as a direction from the court to find intent upon 
proof of the defendant's acts,1 unless the defendant proved the 
contrary by some quantum of proof which may well have been 
considerably greater than some evidence -- thus effectively 
shifting the burden of persuasion on the element of intent. 
Again, due to the lack of qualifying instructions concerning the 
effect of the presumption or inference in Jury Instruction No. 33, 
there is a distinct possibility that the jury interpreted the 
instruction either of the aforementioned ways. 
The trial court is duty-bound to accurately instruct the jury 
as to the applicable law. See State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 428 
(Utah 1986) (plurality). This issue is raised for the first time 
on appeal pursuant to plain error. In State v. Dunn, 850 P. 2d 
1201 (Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme Court outlined the following 
xBy way of Jury Instruction No. 39, the court instructed the jury 
that "[ijntent, being a state of mind, is seldom susceptible of proof 
by direct and positive evidence and may ordinarily be inferred from 
acts, conduct, statement and circumstances." (R. 59) (emphasis 
added). 
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principles involved in establishing "plain error": 
In general, to establish the existence of 
plain error and to obtain appellate relief 
from an alleged error that was not properly 
objected to, the appellant must show the 
following: (i) An error exists; (ii) the 
error should have been obvious to the trial 
court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., 
absent the error, there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for 
the appellant, or phrased differently, our 
confidence in the verdict is undermined. 
Id. at 1208-09; accord State v. Larsen, 2005 UT App 201, 1M5-6, 
113 P.3d 998. According to State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121-22 
(Utah 1989), "in most circumstances, the term 'manifest injustice' 
[found in Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c)] is synonymous with the 'plain 
error7 standard expressly provided in Utah Rule of Evidence 103(d) 
In the instant case, the trial court erred by instructing the 
jury in such a manner as to undermine the jury's responsibility as 
the fact finder and shift the burden of persuasion to Mr. Bennett, 
as the Defendant. The error should have been obvious in light of 
the aforementioned case law both from the United States Supreme 
Court and Utah concerning the effects of such an instruction. 
This error was harmful because the subject instruction 
undermined the jury's responsibility as the ultimate finder of 
fact and it shifted the burden of persuasion to Mr. Bennett, as 
the Defendant, thereby diminishing the required burden-of-proof 
13 
standard to be utilized by the jury in its deliberations. The 
harmfulness is further demonstrated by the focus placed upon the 
circumstances surrounding Jury Instruction No. 33 by the State in 
both its case-in-chief and its closing argument. Had the jury 
been properly instructed or, in other words, absent the error, 
there is a reasonable likelihood that Mr. Bennett would have had 
a more favorable outcome. Based on the totality of circumstances 
surrounding the subject instruction, one's confidence in the 
verdict is significantly undermined. 
II. APPOINTED TRIAL COUNSEL DENIED MR. BENNETT OF HIS 
SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
OF COUNSEL BY FAILING TO OBJECT TO THE TRIAL 
COURT'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION INVOLVING THE 
POSSESSION OF STOLEN PROPERTY. 
The United States Supreme Court, in Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct 2052 (1984), established a two-prong test 
for determining when a defendant's Sixth Amendment2 right to 
effective assistance of counsel has been denied. Id. at 687, 104 
S.Ct. at 2064. This test - adopted by Utah courts - requires a 
defendant to show "first, that his counsel rendered a deficient 
performance in some demonstrable manner, which performance fell 
below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment 
2The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states in 
relevant part that xx[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence." 
14 
and, second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant." 
Bundy v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988); State v. Perry, 
899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); State v. Wright, 893 
P. 2d 1113, 1119 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). " [T] he right to the 
effective assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own 
sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the 
accused to receive a fair trial," or, in this case, a fair 
sentencing. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369, 113 S.Ct. 
838, 842, (1993) . 
To satisfy the first prong of the test, a defendant must 
"'identify the acts or omissions' which, under the circumstances, 
'show that counsel's representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness.'" State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 
(Utah 1990) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 688, 104 S.Ct. 
at 2066, 2064 (footnotes omitted)). A defendant must "overcome 
the strong presumption that trial counsel rendered adequate 
assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment." State 
v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159-60 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 497 
U.S. 1024, 110 S.Ct. 3270 (1990). 
To show prejudice under the second prong of the test, a 
defendant must proffer sufficient evidence to support ua 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different." 
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Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; Templin, 805 P.2d 
at 187. "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
695, 104 S.Ct. at 2069; Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P. 2d 516, 522 
(Utah), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 966, 115 S.Ct. 431 (1994); State v. 
Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986). 
Appointed trial counsel's failure to object to the court's 
proposed Jury Instruction No. 33 fell below an objective standard 
of reasonable professional judgment. This is demonstrated by 
existing United States Supreme Court and Utah case law previously 
discussed above in Argument I and the underlying factual 
circumstances of this case. 
But for counsel's unprofessional error of failing to research 
the proposed instruction and object to it prior to the court 
utilizing it to charge the jury, the result at trial would have 
been different. By objecting to the instruction, the trial court 
more likely than not would have corrected the instruction so as 
not to undermine the jury's responsibility as the ultimate fact 
finder and shift the burden of persuasion to Mr. Bennett, as the 
Defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Bennett respectfully requests 
that this Court reverse his conviction of Burglary and remand the 
16 
case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with 
this Court's instructions as set forth in its opinion. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23rd day of May, 2007. 
JD ^fc WIGGINS, P . C. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, SCOTT L WIGGINS, hereby certify that I personally caused 
to be mailed by First-Class Mail, postage prepaid, two (2) true 
and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the 
following on this 23rd day of May, 2007: 
Mr. J. Frederic Voros, Jr. 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 Soutii, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake jeltyx IXT 84114-0854 
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Tab A 
MELVINC. WILSON " ' -'"° I'KTRfcr C(jbR~ 
Davis County Attorney .,, 
P.O.Box618 l ^ DEC 22 A II 
800 West State Street b 3 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
Telephone: (801) 451-4300 
Fax: (801) 451-4328 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JACOB BENNETT 
DOB: 02/03/1982 
Defendant. 
Bail 
INFORMATION 
Case No. 03/%pM£ f ^ 
OTONo. — J ^ 
The undersigned prosecutor states on information and belief that the defendant, 
either directly or as a party, on or about November 18, 2003 at County of Davis, State of Utah, 
committed the crimes of: 
COUNT 1 
BURGLARY, (294) 76-6-202 UCA, a second degree felony, as follows: That at 
the time and place aforesaid the defendant entered or remained unlawfully in a dwelling or any 
portion of a dwelling with intent to commit: theft. 
COUNT 2 
THEFT, (327) 76-6-404 UCA, a class B misdemeanor, as follows: That at the 
time and place aforesaid the defendant obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the 
property of another with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and that the value of said 
property was less than $300. 
This information is based on evidence obtained from witness Allen Swanson. 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: The undersigned prosecutor is a Deputy 
Davis County Attorney and has received information from the investigating officer, Allen 
Swanson of the Layton Police Department, and the Information herein is based upon such 
personal observations and investigation of said officer. 
The victim reported that on November 18, 2003 her home was broken into and 
several items were stolen, including her checkbook. Approximately 45 minutes after the 
burglary occurred, one of the victim's checks was passed. When the check was passed, a video 
surveillance camera recorded the transaction. When this tape was reviewed, defendant was 
recognized as the person passing the check. 
Authorized December 12,2003 ^ — \ 
for presentment and filing: ( / 
MELVIN C. WILSON V 
Davis i^ ounty Attorney / \ 
Deputy Davis County Attorney 
At the time of filing, issuance of a Summons rather than a Warrant of Arrest is requested. 
TabB 
INSTRUCTION NO.
 g j * ; 5 
Mere possession of recently stolen property, if not coupled with other inculpatory or 
incriminating circumstances, is not sufficient to support a conviction for burglary. Possession of 
articles recently stolen, however, when coupled with circumstances inconsistent with innocence, 
such as hiding or concealing them, or of making a false or improbable or unsatisfactory 
explanation of the possession, may be sufficient to connect the possessor with the offense and to 
justify his conviction for burglary. 
In order for the defendant's possession of recently stolen property to be sufficient to 
support a conviction of burglary, such possession must be recent, that is, not too remote in point 
of time from the crime, personal, exclusive (although it may be joint if definite), distinct, 
conscious, and such possession must be coupled with a lack of a satisfactory explanation or other 
incriminating circumstances as mentioned previously. If these conditions are met, then you may 
consider possession of recently stolen property, coupled with other inculpatory or incriminating 
circumstances as evidence of burglary. 
TabC 
2nd District - Farmington COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
JACOB BENNETT, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
DAY TWO OF JURY TRIAL 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 031702062 FS 
Judge: DARWIN C. HANSEN 
Date: April 2, 2004 
PRESENT 
Clerk: glendap 
Prosecutor: POLL, BRANDON L 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): ARRINGTON, C MARKLEY 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: February 3, 1982 
Video 
Tape Number: 4/2/04 Tape Count: 9.09 
CHARGES 
1. BURGLARY - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 04/02/2004 Guilty 
2. THEFT - Class B Misdemeanor 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 04/02/2004 Guilty 
TRIAL 
Plaintiff's Witness, Officer Todd Derrick, is sworn and direct 
examination. Plaintiff's Exhibit #8 is offered and received. 
TIME: 9:18 AM Cross examination. 
TIME: 9:24 AM Re-direct examination. 
TIME: 9:27 AM Plaintiff's Witness, Sandra Deason, is sworn and 
direct examination. 
TIME: 9:36 AM Cross examination. 
TIME: 9:38 AM Plaintiff's Exhibits #13, #14 and #12 are offered 
and received. Plaintiff will not offer #11, the ring. 
TIME: 9:40 AM The jury is excused and the Court is in recess. 
TIME: 10:08 AM There are no exceptions to the jury instructions 
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Date: Apr 02, 2004 
by either counsel. 
TIME: 10:10 AM Defendant's Witness, Mike Otterstrom, is sworn 
and direct examination. 
TIME: 10:11 AM Cross examination. 
TIME: 10:12 AM Re-direct examination. 
The defense rests. The State rests. Jury Instructions are given. 
Closing arguments by Attorney Poll. 
TIME: 11:03 AM Closing arguments by Attorney Arrington. 
TIME: 11:27 AM Rebuttal by Attorney Poll. 
TIME: 11:47 AM The jury is excused to deliberate. 
TIME: 1:59 PM The jury has reached a verdict. The defendant is 
found guilty of both counts. The defense wishes to have the jury 
polled. 
The defendant elects to be sentenced today and waives the 45 days 
time to be sentenced. 
Restitution to remain open. The State to provide Attorney 
Arrington with an amount for restitution. If agreed, then a 
stipulation and order to be filed with the court. 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of BURGLARY a 2nd Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not 
less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the DAVIS County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
To be served concurrent. 
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SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a Class B Misdemeanor, 
the defendant is sentenced to a term of 180 day(s) 
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE 
To be served at the Utah Stat^ Prison. To be served concurrent. 
Dated this day of 
\&&-^ 
District Court Judge 
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